For two years, from July 1st, 2022 – June 30th, 2024, the Orioles were the 3rd-best team in baseball, compiling a 202-129 record and .610 winning percentage. In the two years since, they’ve been one of baseball’s worst, going 152-175 (.465), which ranks 24th out of 30 teams. A collapse so sudden and drastic is difficult to explain, but here are six contributing factors:
The Competition Improved Drastically
Over the first time period above, the Orioles dominated eight largely bad teams to the tune of a .761 combined winning-percentage:
July 1 2022 – June 30 2024
Orioles vs.:
Marlins | 3-0
Nationals | 7-1
White Sox | 10-3
Angels | 13-4
Rangers | 12-4
Royals | 9-3
Tigers | 7-3
Athletics | 9-4
Combined record: 70-22 (.761)
Combined record vs. the other 22 teams: 132-107 (.552)
A .552 winning percentage against the 22 teams not listed above is obviously nothing to sneeze at, equating to 89 wins over a full season. But the Orioles likely weren’t as good as their overall record indicated during the initial two-year stretch, buoyed by their extreme performance against a small number of mostly subpar opponents.
These weaker teams didn’t stay that way for long. By the second half of 2024, the Royals and Tigers had quickly gone from being uncompetitive to making the playoffs. The Marlins, A’s, Nationals and White Sox became drastically more talented in short order, with all but the A’s currently over .500. Their rebuilds quickly materialized, and with the MLB Draft Lottery beginning in 2023, teams are no longer incentivized to field weak rosters in hopes of getting the highest draft pick.
With virtually no rebuilding teams left to beat up on, the Orioles have suddenly looked a lot more ordinary the last two years. The level of competition across the game has risen substantially while the Orioles have remained stagnant.
The Offensive Approach Stopped Working
Despite multiple hitting coach changes, most believe the Orioles’ offensive philosophy has largely remained unchanged throughout Mike Elias’ tenure as general manager. They preach hitting the ball hard and in the air.
By some metrics, they’ve consistently excelled. Here’s their Statcast hard-hit rate over both time periods:
July 1st, 2022 – June 30th, 2024
• 4th in hard-hit % (40.9%)
Since:
• 4th in hard-hit % (41.9%)
When the Orioles hit the ball, the quality of their contact hasn’t wavered. The problem? Over the last two years, they haven’t hit the ball nearly enough:
July 1st, 2022 – June 30th, 2024
• 11th in total number of batted balls (8,620)
• 3rd in number of hard-hit batted balls (3,525)
• 10th in K% (21.9%)
• 5th in runs scored (1,605)
Since:
• 24th in total number of batted balls (8,112)
• 12th in number of hard-hit batted balls (3,399)
• 26th in K% (23.9%)
• 17th in runs scored (1,417)
The Orioles’ hard-hit rate has actually increased, but with so many fewer balls put into play the last two years, it hasn’t mattered. Their sheer number of balls put into play plummeted from 11th to 24th; hard-hit batted balls dropped from 3rd to 12th; strikeout rate declined from 10th to 26th. As a result, Baltimore’s runs scored went from 5th to 17th over the last two years. The Orioles simply haven’t been making enough contact at the plate, and perhaps their “hit the ball hard in the air” philosophy has resulted in more swing-and-miss the last two years as pitchers’ velocity and spin have continued to increase.
The Young Players Haven’t Progressed
When Mike Elias declared “liftoff” on August 3rd, 2022, the statement was largely based on the belief that his core of talented, young position players would carry the Orioles to consistent playoff contention. Four years later, hardly any of these players have actually taken flight.
Since July 1st, 2024, the league average OPS is .719. Over those two years, just one Oriole has an above-average OPS with at least 500 plate appearances: Gunnar Henderson (.767).
Colton Cowser (.708 OPS), Jackson Holliday (.680), Adley Rutschman (.666), Ryan Mountcastle (.655) and Coby Mayo (.635) have all been below-average hitters. And Jordan Westburg, limited to just 479 plate appearances due to injury, has only been slightly above-average himself (.746 OPS, .299 OBP).
Ryan O’Hearn (.786), Cedric Mullins (.753) and Ramón Urías (.746) all out-hit any of the O’s young hitters besides Henderson over this time period. Elias stuck with his young hitters rather than trading any of them for proven commodities, and he’s paid the price. While still young with sizable untapped potential, they largely haven’t progressed to this point, and the Oriole offense has stalled.
The Defense Hasn’t Delivered
During the first two seasons of the Orioles’ turnaround, 2022-2023, metrics suggest that they were at least an average defensive team. Here’s how they ranked in three key defensive metrics:
Orioles Defensive Rankings | 2022 – 2023
• 7th in Defensive Runs Saved (DRS)
• 13th in Statcast Fieding Run Value (FRV):
• 15th in Outs Above Average (OAA)
Jorge Mateo, Cedric Mullins, Austin Hays, Ramón Urías and Adley Rutschman all graded highly in each metric over these two seasons.
Starting in 2024, it’s been a different story:
Orioles Defensive Rankings | 2024 – 2026
• 23rd in Defensive Runs Saved (DRS)
• 22nd in Statcast Fieding Run Value (FRV)
• 25th in Outs Above Average (OAA)
All three metrics agree that over the last 2 1/2 seasons, Baltimore’s defense has been among the worst in baseball. When looking at the individual performances contributing to these numbers, it’s not surprising that Jackson Holliday, Coby Mayo, Tyler O’Neill, Leody Taveras, Gary Sánchez and Heston Kjerstad each recorded negative values in all three metrics.
The Bullpen Finds Have Dried Up
The Oriole bullpen was a major strength during their two-year run of success, ranking 4th in Fangraphs’ WAR (12.7) and compiling a 3.63 ERA. Since then, the O’s bullpen has been worth just 5.3 WAR, ranking 21st in baseball. Here’s the full breakdown, where you’ll see that the bullpen production has actually declined more than the starting rotation:
July 1st, 2022 – June 30th, 2024
Bullpen: 4th in WAR (12.7), 3.63 ERA
Starting rotation: 12th in WAR (24.7), 3.90 ERA
Since:
Bullpen: 21st in WAR (5.5), 4.60 ERA
Starting rotation: 21st in WAR (18.1), 4.50 ERA
While a healthy Félix Bautista (3.8 WAR) certainly drove much of the bullpen’s success during the first two-year stretch, Mike Elias found plenty of other key contributors on the cheap. Danny Coulombe (1.9 WAR), Cionel Pérez (1.5 WAR), Yennier Cano (1.5 WAR), Bryan Baker (1.1 WAR) and Jacob Webb (0.8 WAR) were all acquired by Elias via waiver claims or trades.
Over the last two years, the Orioles have just two relievers — Cano and Grant Wolfram — who have compiled at least 1.0 WAR (per Fangraphs). The Orioles attempted to replace this production with more expensive additions like Craig Kimbrel, Andrew Kittredge, Seranthony Domínguez, Ryan Helsley and Gregory Soto, who have largely underdelivered.
The Injury Bug Struck
You can’t ignore injuries when outlining the differences between these two-year spans for the Orioles. In 2023, the Orioles were among the healthiest teams in baseball, with the 5th-fewest days on the injured list. In 2024, even with a number of key injuries in the 2nd half, the O’s still saw the 9th-fewest days on the injured list of any team.
By 2025, the O’s ballooned to the 4th-most days on the injured list of any team (2,109). And so far in 2026, Baltimore ranks 6th. They were largely lucky with injuries during their two-year successful run and have seen their fortunes swing drastically in the wrong direction since.